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There has been a recent resurgence of interest in the relationship between income
inequality and growth, manifested in a number of important publications. In parallel with
this, concern with the impact of economic reform and globalization on developing
countries has led to an upsurge of interest in linkages between policy reform, growth,
inequality and poverty. We use the WIDER/UNDP World Income Inequality Database to
investigate the links between growth, inequality and trade liberalization for a sample of
developing countries, and the more limited World Bank Global Poverty Monitoring
Database for an exploratory analysis of the influence of these variables on levels of
poverty. The cross-section results suggest that in the long-run, higher inequality is
associated with lower growth. There is weak evidence that openness is associated with
higher growth. A panel analysis suggests that inequality is unrelated to growth in the short-
run, although trade liberalization appears to have a positive impact on growth. Regarding
poverty, the only consistent patterns are that higher levels of human capital are associated
with lower levels of poverty, while poverty is higher in sub-Saharan Africa. There is no
evidence that growth and trade liberalization affect poverty, although countries that have
sustained an open trade regime appear to have lower levels of poverty.
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There has been a resurgence of interest in the nature of the relationship between inequality
and growth in recent years. This interest can be attributed to a number of factors. First, the
observation that the high-performing East Asian economies exhibited relatively low levels
of inequality whereas many poor-performing economies, especially in Latin America, had
relatively high inequality prompted researchers to consider if inequality was growth
retarding. Second, there has been a dramatic increase in empirical research on economic
growth, and a number of studies include indicators of inequality as a potential determinant
of growth. Furthermore, and more relevant to this study, research on the determinants of
growth in developing countries has become concerned with possible linkages between
policy reform, growth, inequality and poverty.
Our primary interest in this paper is to assess if there is any significant relationship
(empirical regularity) between inequality, trade policy reform, growth and poverty. While
poverty has become the major development concern in recent years, notably in donor aid
policy, the paucity of time series data on poverty across countries renders it a difficult issue
to investigate empirically. Using a combination of the World Bank Global Poverty
Monitoring database (World Bank, 2001) and data from Hanmer and Naschold (2001), we
have, over the period 1985-95, two observations of the level of poverty for over 30
countries. With so little data, our empirical analysis of effects on poverty is preliminary.
We do not test any hypotheses of the determinants of poverty derived from theory, but
rather look for empirical patterns in the data.
Some researchers have circumvented the lack of direct measures by deriving indirect
measures of poverty from data on inequality (Dollar and Kraay, 2001). One difficulty with
this approach is that there is no systematic relationship between inequality and poverty,
even if they tend to be positively correlated over time. Furthermore, there is no systematic
relationship between economic growth and inequality (e.g. Ravallion, 1997). In fact, across
countries and over time inequality, on average, tends to change very little and researchers
have not identified any consistent determinants of changes in inequality (there are few
empirical regularities in the data). This is the principal reason why we do not try to derive
poverty measures from inequality data.
The approach adopted in this paper is to first assess if inequality and trade policy appear to
be determinants of growth. We make use of the data that has recently been made available
in the World Income Inequality Database (WIID, compiled by UNDP and WIDER) to
construct a panel of developing countries, including countries from sub-Saharan Africa
(SSA), for the empirical analysis. Then, we consider if growth, inequality and trade policy
indicators help to explain variations in levels of poverty for the countries in our sample.
Income inequality may have a direct effect in retarding growth. That is, an unequal
distribution of income may mean that the majority of the population does not share in the
benefits of growth, hence the incentives to them to contribute to growth are muted (e.g.
weaker incentives to work harder or be entrepreneurial). This is consistent with some of the
evidence for East Asia—that ‘shared growth’ encourages dynamism and effort (Morrissey
and Nelson, 1998). In this context, inequality captures the fact that a section of society is
disadvantaged, and one might expect a direct positive correlation between inequality and2
poverty. An alternative view is that income inequality is representative of other distortions
in the economy, and can be used as a proxy measure for these growth-retarding features of
the economy. In an economy where power is concentrated, distortions are widespread and
rent-seeking is prevalent, we may expect to observe relatively high levels of inequality
(and relatively poor growth performance). In this interpretation, inequality may not be
directly related to poverty (i.e. inequality is not a causal influence on levels of poverty), but
there will be an indirect effect via slow growth (i.e. the rate of poverty reduction will be
slow in countries with high inequality).
Whilst inequality may proxy for policy distortions, such distortions (or some of them) may
be removed without there being an immediate effect on inequality. For this reason, we
include indicators of trade policy in addition to inequality. Trade liberalization (reduction
or removal of trade-related distortions) should promote growth as it increases the
efficiency of the economy, but the effect on inequality is ambiguous. Workers may shift
from declining (import competing) to expanding (exporting) sectors, without any change in
the overall level of income inequality. In this case there need not be a direct effect of trade
liberalization on the inequality-growth relationship, at least in the short-run. In such a case,
trade liberalization is a signal of policy reform that reduces (some) distortions, and would
be expected to be associated with increased growth rates and, ultimately, lower levels of
poverty.
Section 2 provides a brief overview of the theoretical and empirical literature on the impact
of inequality on growth, and identifies some implications for the effect on poverty. This
review is intended only to establish the context; we do not attempt to test, or discriminate
between, alternative theories (nor, it should be stressed, is our empirical analysis intended
to identify the determinants of growth). Section 3 presents the results for the cross-section,
or long-run, relationship, and finds evidence that inequality does appear to be associated
with lower growth whereas openness (a less restrictive trade policy) tends to be associated
with higher growth. Section 4 extends this analysis to panel estimates and explores the
short-run aspects of the relationships. Although there is no evidence for a consistent short-
run effect of inequality on growth, liberalizing trade policy does appear to lead to higher
growth. Section 5 presents the results for the relationship between growth, inequality, trade
liberalization and poverty. Section 6 concludes by observing that neither growth nor
inequality appear to be important in explaining differences in poverty in our sample. High
levels of human capital and sustained openness do appear to be associated with lower
levels of poverty.
2 A brief overview the literature on inequality and growth
Most of the theoretical economics literature posits that inequality has a negative impact on
growth. There are four general categories of model that explain how an unequal initial
distribution of assets and income can affect growth. For convenience these can be termed
political economy, social conflict, credit market and X-inefficiency models.
The standard political economy explanations of the effect of inequality on growth are
premised on median voter models (Persson and Tabellini, 1994; Bertola, 1993; Partridge,
1997). The greater the inequality shown by the distance between the mean per capita
national income and the median income of the eligible voters, the lower will be growth.
The logic is that political decisions to redistribute income are more likely to be made when3
inequality is greater, and will result in economic policies that tax investment and growth-
promoting activities (Persson and Tabellini, 1994). Alesina and Rodrik (1994) develop a
dynamic endogenous growth model in which the key feature is that individuals differ in
their relative endowment of the accumulated factor (capital) and the non-accumulated
factor (labour). Production is a function of capital, labour and production services offered
by governments financed by a capital tax (that captures the redistributive policies of
government). Growth is a result of investment in capital, which in turn depends on the
after-tax return to capital and therefore investment and growth are lower the higher the tax
rate on capital.
These models assume both implicit, if not actual, democracy and that redistribution is
implemented in a way that reduces growth. The redistribution could have an immediate
effect of reducing poverty, but the slower growth suggests this would not be sustained.
While these models may have some validity for relatively advanced economies, they
hardly seem an appropriate way to represent the majority of developing countries over the
past three decades. The underlying mechanism is that in order to maintain support the
political elite redistributes income and in doing so reduces the return on capital. There is
little evidence for this in developing countries. The successful East Asian economies
implemented redistribution via land reform, public spending or real wages, rather than by
discouraging investment (Morrissey and Nelson, 1998). Few African or Latin American
countries have redistributed income; the productivity of capital may be low, but this is not
because of redistribution.
The social conflict models can also be viewed as political economy in nature, and perhaps
more applicable to the majority of developing countries. The underlying premise is that an
unequal distribution of resources is a source of political tension and social conflict. One
might expect that poverty would be relatively high in unstable environments, or at least
would not be falling significantly. In such a socio-political environment, property rights are
insecure and this discourages accumulation. The higher is the gap between the rich and the
poor, the greater is the temptation to engage in rent seeking and this in turn reduces
investment (Benabou, 1996). Alesina and Perotti (1996) argue that greater inequality leads
to less political stability and consequently sub-optimal investment levels.1 This channel
finds support from Rodrik (1998) who argues that greater inequality increases the share of
resources dedicated to bargaining over distribution of rent thereby slowing the political
system’s effective response to external shocks.
Banerjee and Duflo (2001) propose a model that combines political economy and social
conflict insights. Groups in a society bargain over whether ‘growth-promoting’ policies
will be implemented. In order to ‘buy-off’ the poorer group, the rich have to offer some
redistribution. If insufficient redistribution is offered, the poorer group withholds support
and the beneficial policies are not implemented. While consistent with some of the stylised
facts, this approach has limited applicability to developing countries. First, in developing
countries one rarely observes an attempt, even implicit, of an elite to offer transfers to the
1 A number of recent studies provide evidence for the latter effect in SSA. Gyimah-Brempong and Traynor
(1999) find that political instability has a direct negative effect on growth and also an indirect effect via
discouraging accumulation. Guillaumont et al. (1999) find that SSA has higher levels of primary instabilities
(political, climatic and terms of trade) than other developing country regions, and this reduces growth by
distorting economic policy so that the rate of investment is volatile, thus the growth rate is lowered.4
poor (hence poverty is not falling over time).2 Second, the elite often resists change not
because of bargaining but because it threatens their control over resources and rents. The
problem in many developing countries is that no bargaining occurs. Thus, while Banerjee
and Duflo (2001) are concerned to explain how (breakdowns) in bargaining give rise to
changes in inequality (redistribution) that reduce growth, the fact of developing countries is
that inequality is persistent.
The credit market channel proposed by Chatterjee (1991) and Tsiddon (1992) is
underpinned by the fact that investments are lumpy and access to credit depends on the
existence of collateral. Consequently, there is a credit constraint stemming from unequal
initial distribution of assets, and this hinders growth. In this context, inequality of land
holdings represents a constraint on growth in the agriculture sector, typically the major
productive sector in poor developing countries. This is consistent with arguments that
stress the importance of land reform to provide a platform for growth. A related argument
is that greater income equality encourages human capital accumulation, as there are fewer
liquidity constraints and investment in human capital is lumpy (Chiu, 1998). The poor
would tend to face the most severe credit constraints and these models offer one
explanation for why it is so difficult for the poor to lift themselves out of poverty. Targeted
policy interventions are required to reduce poverty.
A fourth approach is based on the argument that high inequality reduces the X-efficiency
of workers. X-efficiency refers to a measure of workers’ productivity holding constant all
other inputs into the production process including workers’ skills (Leibenstein, 1966, cited
in Birdsall et al., 1995). Workers’ productivity is limited by a ‘virtual’ glass ceiling as they
do not visualise themselves progressing beyond a certain point and this discourages effort
and perpetuates a vicious cycle of low incomes and therefore high inequality. Thus,
inequality has a disincentive effect that retards growth. This model relates to incentives and
labour productivity (and is not obviously linked to poverty), rather than investment and
accumulation (that underpin the other models). As such, this can be viewed as a direct
effect of inequality on growth that should be apparent even over the relatively short run.
The accumulation-based models, on the contrary, are long-run in nature and relate
i n e q u a l i t yt og r o w t hi na ni n d i r e c tw a y .
2.1 Empirical evidence on inequality and growth
The classic empirical hypothesis on the relationship between inequality and growth is the
well known Kuznets (1955) ‘inverted U relationship’ between per capita income increases
and income inequality. There are three types of argument for why the relationship takes
this form. First, Birdsall et al. (1995) argue that as labour shifts from the sector with low
productivity (agriculture) to the sector of high productivity (industry), aggregate inequality
must initially increase. Second, and in a similar vein, the Lewis dual economy model
predicts rising profits in the modern sector while the traditional sector remains stagnant,
generating between-sector inequalities. The third explanation looks to an initial unequal
distribution of assets as contributing to inequality; those endowed with assets accumulate
more compared with those only endowed with labour, but in the process of development
this is offset by rising labour incomes. The empirical literature is somewhat inconclusive;
2 This may be one reason why donors now place a ‘pro-poor orientation’ so high on the agenda for aid and
debt relief. Arguably, such external funding of expenditures targeted on the poor obviates, or at least
postpones, the need for redistributing domestic resources.5
Deininger and Squire (1996, 1998) argue that the hypothesis is rejected with the use of
proper econometric methods and a clean database. However, in a recent sophisticated
analysis Banerjee and Duflo (2001) do find that the relationship between inequality and
growth is non-linear for many countries.
Table 1
Overview of some studies on inequality and growth
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Source: Summary of indicated studies compiled by the authors.
Notes: Most studies report results with various samples, often using different econometric techniques; the
principal results are included here. 2SLS is two stage least squares. * this study also includes results for
samples with developed countries.
The 1990s has seen a growing interest in research on whether inequality retards growth.
The results of a number of studies are summarized in Table 1. Most empirical work has
relied on the Gini coefficient or income share as measures of inequality. Birdsall et al.
(1995) find weak evidence for a negative effect of inequality on economic growth (but the
finding is not significant on inclusion of a Latin America dummy variable). They also find
that land inequality is a greater (negative) influence on growth than income inequality, a
result similar to Alesina and Rodrik (1994). Birdsall and Londono (1997) find that
although initial land inequality is a significant determinant of growth, it appears not to be
robust to the inclusion of dummies for Latin America (Knowles, 2001, offers an
explanation for this). Initial education inequality appears to have the greatest influence on
growth among all the variables capturing initial inequality. Deininger and Squire (1998)
find a negative link between initial inequality and subsequent growth, although this result
is only robust for land inequality. This negative relationship is supported by other studies.
Of the seven studies in Table 1, five found a negative relationship between income6
inequality and growth in the long-run, while for two the effect was insignificant or not
robust. Benabou (1996: Table 2) summarizes a range of studies and shows that the balance
of evidence is for a negative and significant relationship.
The differences in the results from studies of the inequality-growth relationship can be
largely attributed to four factors (all identified in Table 1)—differences in data quality,
time period, sample coverage and estimation methods. Data quality is a general problem in
growth regressions including developing countries, but is especially acute for inequality
data. The Deininger and Squire (1996)3 database is widely accepted as one of the most
reliable sources of data on inequality (and is included in the WIID data source we draw
on). Knowles (2001) provides a critical discussion of this data, demonstrating that the use
of income as against expenditure based measures biases the results. Deininger and Squire
(1998) use this ‘high quality’ data and find a negative (albeit non-robust) link between
initial income inequality and subsequent growth. This negative relationship is supported by
other studies including Persson and Tabellini (1994) and Alesina and Rodrik (1994)
although they do not use the high quality dataset.
With regard to the time period, almost all studies before 1996 are based on long period
averages for a cross-section of countries, and thus capture any ‘long-run’ relationship.
Later studies use the Deininger and Squire (1996) data that provides observations for a
large number of countries for a number of years during 1960-92. Forbes (2000), for
example, uses sub-period panels to examine the ‘short-run’ relationship. She finds a
positive, significant and robust relationship between inequality and growth in the medium
and short run, that is, higher inequality is associated with higher growth. This is in contrast
to the evidence for a negative relationship in the long-run.
Another factor explaining the divergence in results is the sample coverage. Forbes (2000),
for example, includes no sub-Saharan African country and half of the sample comprises
OECD countries (most others are relatively rich developing countries). About half of the
countries in the samples used by Deininger and Squire (1998), Barro (1999), Banerjee and
Duflo (2001) are developing. The evidence suggests that the relationship is different for
OECD as compared with developing countries. Deininger and Squire (1998) also find a
negative, significant and robust effect of initial land inequality on growth, a result that
holds true for all countries in their sample and also for a sample of developing countries.
Another reason for differences in results could be the estimation methods. Cross-section
estimation methods have many weaknesses, documented by, among others, Levine and
Renelt (1992). The use of panel estimation methods to control for country and time specific
effects has been precluded by the paucity of good quality data. Forbes (2000) stands out in
this regard. Furthermore, the inability of cross-country work to address the effect of a
change in a country’s inequality level on within-country growth provides justification for
use of panel data methods (Forbes, 2000).
What emerges from the foregoing discussion is that there is likely to be a negative
relationship between inequality and growth in the long-run, although this may not be the
case in the short-run. In general one would expect poverty to be higher in countries with
3 This paper provides a discussion of the criteria for selecting and cleaning the data and a critical discussion
of the data used in earlier studies.7
higher levels of inequality. Research on the inequality-growth relationship has tended not
to include SSA countries in the sample, nor has the potential role of trade and trade policy
been explored. As trade liberalization is an indicator of economic policy shifting to a
market-oriented regime with greater incentives, it should have a positive impact on growth.
The empirical analysis of the next section thus extends the literature in these two
directions—focussing on developing countries and including trade variables.
3. Cross-section (long-run) results
For the basic ‘long-run’ regression we use cross-section data for 44 developing countries
over 1970-95 (details on data sources are provided in the Appendix). The growth literature
points to the importance of initial values in explaining subsequent growth. We estimate a
standard version of the cross-country growth regressions now prevalent in the literature.
The base specification is a modification of Lensink and Morrissey (2000), including initial
inequality (GINI), the value of the Gini index for the year closest to 1970) but excluding
aid. The basic variables in the growth regressions are the investment/GDP ratio (INV,
average over the period), initial income per capita in 1970 (GDP0) and initial human
capital as proxied by the secondary-school enrolment rate in 1970 (HC0).4 The basic
equation estimated, where the dependent variable is per capita GDP growth over the period
(g), is:
g=b0 + b1GINI+ b2GDP0 + b3HC0 + b4INV + m (1)
GDP0 and HC0 are included because they have been shown to have a robust and
significant impact on economic growth (Lensink and Morrissey, 2000). GDP0 captures
convergence and its expected sign is negative. The coefficient on GINI is expected to be
negative. The coefficients on HC0 and INV, representing human and physical capital
respectively, and are expected to have positive signs.
This specification is similar to that used in most empirical work in this area (Perotti, 1996,
Forbes, 2000), although precise measures of the variables differ from study to study. The
variables included are widely accepted as core explanatory variables. The reasons for not
including additional variables are similar to those advanced by Forbes (2000) and Perroti
(1996), namely; the need to maximise degrees of freedom given the limited availability of
inequality data and to facilitate comparability between studies. The results should be
interpreted cautiously given the limited sample size and the exclusion of variables that
others have found to be significant determinants of growth.
Table 2 presents the results from estimating the basic equation. Investment is the principal
‘driver’ of growth, an expected result although our human capital variable is not
significant. While growth may itself be a determinant of investment, implying potential
endogeneity, our use of the average investment/GDP ratio implies that this should not be a
serious problem for overall period growth rates. Endogeneity of inequality is not a problem
as we are using the initial value of the Gini but period growth. Similarly, as the dependent
variable is long-term growth it is unlikely that endogeneity of other explanatory variables
4 We tried alternative human capital measures, such as average years of schooling, but the results were
unaffected.8
is a problem. The coefficient on GINI is found to be negative, i.e. higher inequality results
in lower growth. This result is quite robust in the three specifications reported. We also
find that the dummy for SSA countries (SSA) has a negative coefficient, although only
weakly significant. The significance of the coefficient on GINI is reduced by the inclusion
of SSA, suggesting that in the sample SSA countries may have relatively higher initial
inequality, but there appears to be a negative SSA effect on growth that is independent of
inequality.5 The coefficient on initial GDP is weakly significant only when SSA is included
and HC0 excluded, suggesting collinearity between these three variables.
Table 2




























R–squared (adj) 0.652 0.680 0.677
Observations 44 44 44
Source: Authors’ estimates.
Notes: Figures in parentheses are t-ratios: ***denotes significant at 1 percent level, **significant at 5 percent
and *significant at 10 percent. The F-test supports the hypothesis that all coefficients are jointly significant (i.e.
rejects the null that all are zero). HC0 is not significant even if initial GDP omitted. Diagnostic tests reveal no
evidence of serial correlation or heteroscedasticity. The normality assumption of the error term is not violated
and tests support the functional form used.
It is well known that collinearity causes the sampling variances, standard errors and
covariances of the least squares estimator to be large, implying high sampling variability
and wide interval estimates and consequently reduced precision of the estimates. The
literature points to possible correlation between physical capital investment (INV)a n d
investment in human capital (HC0) as well as correlation between income inequality and
secondary school enrolment. This is not strongly supported by our dataset, with correlation
coefficients of 0.24 and -0.048 respectively. As the coefficient on HC0 is not significant,
this is the variable we choose to drop (regression 1.3). In doing this we follow other
studies, such as Clarke (1995), Deininger and Squire (1996). This implies that the
5 There is a general tendency for sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) countries to perform relatively badly (e.g. an
‘SSA’ dummy is negative and significant) in cross-country growth regressions. ‘Africa’s slow growth is thus
partly explicable in terms of particular variables that are globally important for the growth process but are
low in Africa’ (Collier and Gunning, 1999: 65). This begs the question why these variables are especially low
in Africa, an issue not pursued here.9
coefficient on GINI includes any indirect effect of income inequality on growth through its
effect on education (Knowles, 2001).
Knowles (2001) notes that if the Gini is measured on an expenditure rather than an income
basis, its significance tends to decline and he argues that empirical researchers should use a
consistent definition of the Gini. Unfortunately, this would leave us with very small
samples of countries with Gini measured on the same basis. Following Deininger and
Squire (1998) and Forbes (2000) we adjusted the expenditure based Gini to an income
based measure using the Deininger and Squire (1996) adjustment. The estimated
coefficients on INV and GINI are similar to those in regression (2.3).6 However, the
significance of the Gini is reduced, as posited by Knowles (2001), and both initial GDP
and the SSA dummy become insignificant. This reaffirms the collinearity and data quality
problems in growth regressions for developing countries. Nevertheless, the estimated sign
and coefficient on the inequality variable appears robust to alternative specifications.
We now introduce indicators of the orientation of the trade regime into specification (1).
There is a large literature on the relationship between trade policy and growth, and the
difficulties of measuring trade stance are well known (see Edwards, 1993, 1998;
Greenaway et al, 1998; Milner and Morrissey, 1999; Rodrik, 1992, 1998, 1999). Given the
problems of measuring openness we use two of the more widely accepted measures. The
Black Market Premium (BMP, defined as (black market rate/official rate)-1) is a good
indicator of the overall level of distortion in the economy as it captures the deviation of the
exchange rate from its market level. The second indicator is the proportion of years
between 1965 and 1990 that an economy could be considered open, the Sachs-Warner
index (OPEN). Both measures are drawn from Sachs and Warner (1997). It should be
noted that few of the African economies liberalized much before 1990. The choice of the
indicators is driven by their demonstrated robustness in empirical studies (Harrison, 1996;
Edwards, 1998).7 Again, we emphasize that we are seeking to identify correlations and the
results should not be interpreted as implying a causal relationship.
The results from cross-section estimation are in Table 3, representing the addition of trade
openness variables to the regressions in Table 2. Column (3.1) shows that when BMP is
included it has a negative and significant coefficient whereas the coefficient on GINI
becomes insignificant. This may indicate possible collinearity between GINI and BMP
although the correlation between the two is relatively low (0.295). A plausible
interpretation is that BMP and GINI do not always proxy for the same distortions, but they
do in general. In other words, the results suggest that it is not inequality per se that retards
growth but inequality may encourage the types of distortions that retard growth, and these
are often captured by the BMP.
The results from regressions (3.2) and (3.3) show that when OPEN is added to the basic
model including GINI the coefficient on OPEN is insignificant, although the SSA dummy
6 As this adjustment is rather ad hoc we do not report the results (they are available on request).
7 Dollar and Kraay (2001) in a study with a similar focus to ours, use a trade volume measure to capture
trade policy. The disadvantage with their approach is that one must infer policy from observed volume
changes (that may be attributable to non-policy factors in an unsystematic way). As our concern is to capture
the signal of trade policy change, the openness measure used here (and the timing of liberalization measure
used in the next section) is appropriate, if imperfect.10
also becomes insignificant. This suggests that controlling for inequality, openness does not
add any explanatory power; SSA countries tend to have low values of OPEN but high
values of GINI. When OPEN is included on its own, the coefficient is positive and
significant, while the SSA dummy is negative and significant. Note that the correlation
between GINI and OPEN is very low (-0.07). Thus, the results in (3.3) suggest that
openness is conducive to growth; the negative SSA dummy captures the fact that SSA
countries only liberalized their trade regime from the late 1980s or early 1990s, towards the
end of our sample, hence the value of OPEN will be low for them.
Table 3






























R-squared (adj) 0.711 0.688 0.694
N4 4 4 4 4 4
Source: Authors’ estimates.
Notes: As for Table 2. The F-test supports the hypothesis that all coefficients are jointly significant and
diagnostic tests support the specification.
The results in Table 4, regressions (4.1) and (4.2), confirm our earlier suggestion that BMP
and GINI are capturing essentially similar effects (in the long-run), even if the correlation
between them is relatively low. It is plausible to argue that BMP represents general
inefficiencies in the economy that may arise due to inequality (for example, increased
corruption or rent seeking). Either included alone has a negative and significant coefficient,
while the interaction term (GINIBMP) also has a negative and significant coefficient, but
its inclusion renders either of the other terms insignificant. We can note the SSA dummy is
only (weakly) significant (and negative) in permutation (4.1), suggesting that the negative
SSA effect is not fully explained by inequality (although it is captured by BMP).
Regressions (4.3), (4.4) and (4.5) show that the growth-inequality-openness relationship is
somewhat more complicated. Previous results showed that inequality alone has a negative
effect on growth, openness alone has a positive effect but when both are included together
the negative inequality effect dominates. The inclusion of the interaction terms allows us to
elaborate, noting that its inclusion adds nothing to the regression with GINI only (4.3).
However, in (4.4) we find a negative and significant coefficient on OPEN, but this is offset11
Table 4
Cross-section regressions with interaction terms





















































R2 (adj) 0.719 0.729 0.684 0.676 0.734
N 4 44 44 44 4 4 4
Source: Authors’ estimates.
Notes: As for Table 2. The F-test supports the hypothesis that all coefficients are jointly significant and
diagnostic tests support the specification. (4.2) was estimated including GINI but the coefficient was
insignificant and that on GINIBMP became insignificant; other coefficients were largely unaffected. (4.5) was
estimated without SSA but the coefficients were largely unaltered.
by the positive and significant coefficient on the interaction term (regression (4.5) is
consistent with this). Note that the negative SSA effect persists unless GINI is also
included. The implication appears to be that initial inequality helps to explain poor growth,
and openness itself does not add to this explanation. This partly reflects limitations in the
openness measure. The effect of openness on growth seems to depend on the level of
inequality. Surprisingly, perhaps, openness appears to have a positive effect on growth
only when inequality is high, except for SSA countries (the dummy term is negative and
significant). An interpretation is that for the non-African countries in the sample, when
those with high inequality liberalized the trade regime the effect was to increase growth,
perhaps because liberalization under high inequality had a greater impact on relative
incentives, i.e. a more dramatic effect on economic performance.
As GINI is an initial value, growth is an outcome over the whole period and trade
liberalization is an event at some point during the period, the specification estimated here
may be misleading. The OPEN variable is the proportion of the time a country was
liberalized, and will be higher the earlier the country liberalized (and very low for most
SSA countries). Political economy models would predict that high inequality is associated
with distortions to the economy, and should discourage liberalization. These models do
not, however, predict what would happen when liberalization occurs. On the one hand, one
may expect that high inequality implies that the benefits of liberalization will be unevenly12
distributed. On the other hand, liberalization itself may be a sign that inequality (or at least
the distortions induced by inequality) is being reduced. The above results lean in favour of
the latter interpretation: openness has a positive growth impact in countries with high
inequality, perhaps because it does not impact so much on distribution or incentives in
societies with moderate inequality. It is therefore important to try and locate the timing of
openness, hence the need for the panel approach undertaken in the next section.
4 Panel data (short run) estimates
This section employs panel estimation methods to investigate whether there is a difference
in the long and short run effects of inequality on growth, and the relationship of this to
trade liberalization. A panel is constructed of five 5-year time periods running from 1970-4
to 1990-4. A sub-set of the countries in the cross-section analysis is used (determined by
data availability). The indicator of the timing of trade liberalization used is the Sachs and
Warner (SW) index, a dummy variable taking a value of 1 for each year beginning from the
year when liberalization is said to have occurred and 0 before this.8 We also augment the
Sachs-Warner index (SWaug) to add another five countries using our judgement of when
they liberalized (see Appendix). Investment is Gross Domestic Investment as a percentage
of GDP averaged over the five year period (GDIP). The GINI is income inequality at the
start of the five-year period, or as near to then as available (from WIID). A period dummy
(PDum) is used for 1980-94, during which most of the sample liberalized their trade
regime. Starting income is measured as the log of initial GDP (GDP0)i ne a c hp e r i o d .
Results are reported in Table 5. The coefficient on GINI is insignificant, in contrast to
Forbes (2000) who finds these to be positive and significant. The difference in the results
can be attributed to several factors, notably differences in samples, data and estimation
technique—Forbes (2000) used GMM estimators but our data are inadequate to avail of
that particular technique. As previously, investment is a major determinant of growth, and
there is evidence for convergence within the sample. We find evidence that trade
liberalization, as proxied by the SW (or our augmented SW) index, is associated with
higher growth. Note that the period dummy has a negative coefficient (only significant if
openness indicators included), implying that liberalization offset some other negative effect
on growth. However, this equation may be mis-specified as GDIP is likely to be
endogenous, i.e. growth is a determinant of average investment rates during each period.
Endogeneity of inequality does not appear to be a problem—the values of the Gini for each
country change little over time, and growth does not appear to be a determinant of the
change in inequality (results available on request). To address the problem of endogeneity
of investment, we re-estimated the equation without investment, but including initial
education level (SEC, initial values of secondary school enrolment rates for each period) as
a proxy for initial capital.9 In Table 6 the results suggest that trade liberalization does
promote growth, whereas inequality independently appears to have no short run effect on
growth. There is weak evidence of convergence, and that countries with higher levels of
human capital tend to exhibit higher rates of growth. There is also evidence that growth
8 We are grateful to Peter Wright for providing the data. We also tried the World Bank and Dean indicators
used in Greenaway, Morgan and Wright (1998), but the coefficient was insignificant in almost all
specifications.
9 We also tried alternative measures of human capital, but the coefficients were never significant.13
performance was generally poor in the 1980-94 period, due to factors not specified in our
model.
Table 5
Panel regressions with Sachs-Warner indices





































R2 (adj) 0.375 0.293 0.402 0.459
N 129 129 145 145
Source: Authors’ estimates.
Notes: As for Table 2. The Lagrange Multiplier test did not reject the null hypothesis that pooled least squares
(POLS) is appropriate against an alternative of fixed or random effects in (5.2) Where appropriate, the
Hausman test was used to choose between Random Effects and Fixed Effects models. Tests supported the
efficiency of fixed effects models for (5.1), (5.3) and (5.4). Further results available on request.
Table 6




























R2 (adj) 0.1676 0.2391 0.3704
N 132 132 148
Source: Authors’ estimates.
Notes: As for Table 5. Tests supported the efficiency of POLS for (6.2) , whereas random effects estimates are
reported in (6.1) and fixed effects in 6.3. Further results available on request.14
This may resolve part of the dilemma we found at the end of the previous section. In the
long-run cross-section analysis, inequality could have been related to the timing of
liberalization hence interacted with OPEN. In other words, liberalization could have been
later, hence a lower value of OPEN, in countries that initially had higher levels of
inequality. We address this in the panel, and find that trade liberalization itself is associated
with increased growth rates, whereas inequality is not significant in the short-run. A
plausible interpretation is that trade liberalization removes some of the distortions that
constrain growth, hence growth tends to improve.
Table 7
Cross-section influences on level of poverty




































































2 (adj) 0.38 0.31 0.28 0.50 0.18 0.61
N2 0 1 9 1 9 1 9 1 9 3 2
F (prob) 0.05 0.08 0.12 0.02 0.18 0.000
(with outlier) (no outlier) (no outlier) (no outlier) (no outlier)
Source: Authors’ estimates.
Notes: Significance levels as for Table 2. The criterion of values of at least 2 standard deviations from the
mean was used to identify outliers on specific variables (see discussion in Dalgaard and Hansen, 2001).
Zambia (POV1) is thus omitted from columns 2 and 3. POV2 regressions were also estimated including the
outlier (Jamaica) but the results were weaker. Botswana NRE), Guyana (NRE), Korea (SEC0) and Zambia
(POV2) were also outliers, but omitted anayway due to missing observations. The specification was estimated
with growth over 1970-85 rather than previous period growth (g); the coefficient was significant only when SSA
excluded, otherwise results were similar.
5. Provisional results on growth, trade and poverty
Ideally, we would like to extend the analysis of the previous sections to address effects on
poverty. Unfortunately, adequate data on poverty are not available for all of the countries
included here and the data that are available only provide observations after 1985 (World
Bank, 2001; Hanmer and Naschold, 2001). We were able to obtain two observations on the
poverty headcount (percentage of the population below the international $1PPP per day15
poverty line) for 32 of the countries used in the earlier analysis. We here present some
exploratory analysis using this data.
We constructed the following dataset. For each of 32 countries there are two observations
of poverty, POV1 (1985-90) and POV2 (after 1990). The explanatory variables used are all
lagged (i.e. they refer to the previous five-year period) and growth (g) is the first difference
of the log of GDP per capita between the start and end of the preceding period.
Unfortunately, data on the ‘lagged values’ for all explanatory variables were only available
for 22 of the countries, hence restricting our sample. The explanatory variables are as
previously defined, except for the addition of natural resource endowment (NRE),
measured as land area per worker. This variable is used to capture the tendencies for
poverty to be higher in rural areas (the agricultural sector should be a larger share of the
economy in relatively land abundant economies) and for countries dependent on primary
commodity exports to exhibit slower growth (hence poverty will be higher).
The results are presented in Table 7. Considering the results without the outliers, there is
fairly strong evidence that poverty is lower in countries with higher levels of human capital
(measured as secondary school enrolment in previous period). The SSA dummy is positive
and highly significant, implying that there are omitted variables specific to Africa that are
associated with high levels of poverty. These are the only variables that are consistently
significant. The coefficient on previous period growth (g) is not significant. Surprisingly,
perhaps, the coefficients on inequality and NRE are negative when significant. The
coefficient on GINI is only significant when SSA included. Controlling for human capital
and whether the country is in SSA, poverty appears to be lower in countries where
inequality or land abundance are relatively high. As argued in the previous sections, the
other explanatory variables are themselves determinants of growth. Thus, the coefficient on
the other variables can be interpreted as their effect independent of any effect via growth
(that, anyway, appears to be absent).
Trade liberalization is not related to poverty, in the sense that the coefficient on SWaug is
not significant. However, this may not be a good measure as one would not expect
liberalization to have a consistent immediate effect on relative levels of poverty. In the
final column of Table 7 we use the same variables used in the cross-section analysis of
Section 3 (i.e. initial values in the 1970s for GDP and GINI and average value for SEC),
include initial NRE and OPEN and present results for POV2 with a larger sample. The
coefficient on OPEN is negative and significant (SSA is omitted as it is highly correlated
with OPEN). Countries with a relatively more open trade regime during 1965-90 tended to
have relatively lower levels of poverty in the early 1990s. The only other significant
variable is secondary enrolment, and again the coefficient is negative.
Implicit in the cross-section approach is the assumption that the coefficient on the
explanatory variables is the same for each country. It follows that we can treat each
observation of poverty as independent and pool the sample (i.e. we assume the coefficient
on the explanatory variables are the same for each country over time in addition to
assuming the coefficients are the same for all countries). Thus, to permit a larger sample
for the exploratory analysis, we pool the data. The results are in Table 8, where growth
refers to the difference of log GDP per capita between 1980 and 1984 for POV1 and
between 1985 and 1989 for POV2. Again, the coefficient on growth is insignificant but
countries with higher levels of human capital tend to have lower poverty. Controlling for
the other variables, SSA countries have higher levels of poverty. Inequality again appears16
to be negatively associated with poverty (significantly so when we omit outliers).
Accounting for the tendency of poverty to be higher in SSA and lower in countries with
high levels of secondary enrolment, it appears that poverty is lower in countries with high
inequality. Openness appears to have no independent effect on poverty.
Table 8























2 (adj) 0.519 0.569
N4 5 4 1
F (prob) 0.0000 0.0000
Estimator POLS POLS
with outliers no outliers
Source: Authors’ estimates.
Notes: As for Table 7. Results for tests for choosing between POLS, FEM and REM are available on request.
The countries excluded as outliers are Botswana, India, Jamaica and Zambia. The model was estimated with
NRE but the coefficient was highly insignificant. A version with a smaller sample was estimated with SWaug;
the coefficient was insignificant and otherwise results were similar.
Our data only relate to poverty levels (there are too few observations to construct a
reasonable sample for changes in poverty). As it would take time for growth to affect
poverty, and the responsiveness of poverty to growth will differ across countries, it is
perhaps not surprising that we fail to find evidence that previous period growth rates help
to explain relative levels of poverty. We do find that higher levels of human capital are
associated with lower poverty. To the extent that long-run growth is associated with rising
levels of secondary school enrolment, this suggests a pro-poor pattern of growth (i.e.
growth that reduces the poverty headcount). Similarly, a sustained relatively open trade
regime also appears to be part of a pro-poor growth pattern (in Table 7).
There is weak evidence that higher levels of inequality (either initially, in the 1970s, or in
the previous period), once we control for whether a country is in SSA, are associated with
lower levels of poverty. This supports the observation made earlier that there is no
systematic relationship between inequality and poverty (the correlation of -0.14 is quite
low). In SSA countries there is a damaging combination of high inequality, low growth,
low human capital and restrictive trade policies. In non-SSA countries, we can at least say
that inequality is not a source of poverty, whilst education and openness appear to reduce
poverty.17
6 Conclusions
Inequality retards growth because it is associated with policy distortions. The conventional
view, as outlined in Section 2, is that income inequality tends to be associated with (or
even a proxy for) inequalities in the distribution of power. High inequality will be
associated with distortions in the economy, such as high levels of protection, and
incentives for rent-seeking behaviour. These in turn tend to reduce growth. Thus,
inequality and restrictive trade policies will tend to be correlated, at least in the long-run,
and both associated with lower growth. Trade liberalization is an indicator of economic
policy reform in which distortions are reduced and market incentives increased.
Consequently, it should be growth-promoting, but may not have any systematic effect on
inequality.
This paper uses cross-section and panel econometric techniques to investigate the links
between growth, inequality and trade liberalization. A number of general conclusions
emerge from our sample of 44 developing countries. First, inequality does tend to retard
growth in the long-run (there is no evidence for a short-run effect), whereas trade
liberalization tends to be associated with increased growth. There is not a high correlation
between initial income inequality and initial GDP per capita, so it is not evident that poorer
countries necessarily have higher inequality. Africa does appear to be different—SSA
countries have a below average growth performance that cannot be explained fully by the
variables we consider, including inequality. The results suggest that it is not inequality per
se that retards growth but rather that inequality may encourage the types of distortions that
reduce economic performance.
In the long-run estimates, openness (measured as the proportion of the period the country
was defined as open) is not consistently related to growth. On the basis that the timing of
liberalization may be important, we conducted a panel analysis for five 5-year periods over
1970-94. The results suggest that in the short run trade liberalization appears to be
associated with increased growth, whilst inequality does not appear to affect growth. These
principal results are quite robust to alternative specifications.
We then presented an exploratory analysis of the influence of growth, inequality and trade
liberalization on poverty. The only strong patterns in the data are that countries with higher
levels of human capital also appear to have relatively lower levels of poverty, whereas
poverty levels are higher in SSA. There is no evidence that differences in growth rates are
associated with differences in levels of poverty for the countries in our sample. Inequality,
controlling for other variables, appears to be negatively associated with poverty. The
timing of trade liberalization does not appear to be related to poverty, suggesting that any
effects take time, but countries with less restrictive trade policies over a sustained period
tend to have lower levels of poverty at the end.
We do not identify the factors explaining differences in levels of poverty across countries,
but we do identify some factors that are important. Countries with lower levels of poverty
are those that invested in human capital and sustained a relatively open trade regime. In
such countries, relatively high levels of inequality are not associated with relatively high
levels of poverty (if anything, the reverse is the case). Thus, just as we argued that
inequality per se may not be a constraint on growth, inequality itself is not a bar on
reducing poverty. It is the policy distortions that tend to be associated with high levels of18
inequality that retard growth, and it is the patterns of growth, rather than growth itself, that
determines the effect on reducing poverty. Our results also caution against concluding that
a pattern of growth that reduces inequality automatically reduces poverty. Some countries
with relatively high levels of inequality nevertheless have relatively low levels of poverty.
The ‘negative’ sub-Saharan Africa effect identified in the empirical growth literature
appears to persist in levels of poverty: not only do SSA countries have lower levels of the
variables associated with lower poverty, but even controlling for this poverty is higher in
SSA countries. The unobserved (in this study) characteristics of SSA countries that
contribute to poor growth performance also appear to contribute to high levels of poverty.
It is beyond the scope of this paper to address what these may be (Collier and Gunning,
1999, provide a discussion). If the policy objective is to reduce poverty in SSA, a focus on
growth, human capital and removing distortions in trade policy is warranted, and these
factors are more important than a focus on inequality itself. However, the disadvantages
faced by SSA countries go deeper than these variables, and addressing these factors only
will be insufficient to attain poverty-reducing growth.
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Appendix: List of variables and data sources
GDP0 = GDP per capita in 1970
GROWTH = average real per capita growth rate over 1970-95 period
INV = average investment to GDP ratio over 1970-95 period
BMP = Black Market Premium, computed as [(black market rate/official rate)-1]
OPEN = Proportion of the years between 1965 and 1990 that the economy is considered to
be open by the criteria set by Sachs and Warner (1997).
GINIBMP = Interaction variable GINI*BMP
GINIOP = Interaction Variable GINI*OPEN
SEC = secondary school enrolment rate
GINI = Gini coefficient of income inequality
SSA = dummy variable with the value of unity for countries in Sub-Saharan Africa and
zero for all others
POV1 = Average Headcount Index (% below $ 1 per day PPP 1993) 1985-89
POV2 = Average Head count Index 1990-94.
Sources: World Development Indicators 1997 (CD-ROM) Barro–Lee dataset, World
Income Inequality Database (WIID) World Bank (2001) and Sachs and Warner (1997).
Descriptive summary statistics
Series N Mean Std dev Minimum Maximum
GDP0 44 1052.7 1100.8 92.2288 5736.6
GINI 44 46.8132 11.4625 27.9 79.5
SEC0 44 25.5682 14.9688 1.000 59.000
INV 44 21.7489 5.5350 10.5600 35.45
Additional countries for augmented Sachs-Warner index
1970-4 1975-9 1980-4 1985-9 1990-4
E g y p t 0 0001
N e p a l 0 0001
M a d a g a s c a r 0 0011
N i g e r i a 0 0010
T u r k e y 0 0011